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NOTES
ONCE AROUND THE FLAG POLE: CONSTRUCTION
BIDDING AND CONTRACTS AT FORMATION
I
INTRODUCTION
The number of cases involving construction bidding has increased
significantly in the last two years.' The cases reveal a factual similarity.
A general contractor, competing for a construction contract, solicits
bids from subcontractors to compute a total bid. After selecting the
lowest subcontractor bid, he submits that bid as part of his total bid
for the main construction contract. The general contractor is awarded
the main contract, but before he can formally accept, the subcontractor
withdraws his bid. The reason usually given for this withdrawal is that
the subcontractor has made an error in his estimate, bidding too low.
The general contractor, bound on the main contract by his total bid, is
forced to contract with a higher bidding subcontractor. He sues the
subcontractor for this additional cost. Courts generally find the mistake
insubstantial and reason that the general contractor cannot be charged
with knowledge that the bid was erroneous. Having overcome this
obstacle, his success in the suit will depend upon whether the sub-
contractor was bound to perform at the submitted bid price.
The common law rule is that an offer can always be withdrawn
before it is accepted2 On the given facts, therefore, some courts find
no contract.3 Recently, cases have held that if the general contractor
justifiably relied to his detriment on the subcontract bid, the sub-
contractor's offer becomes firm.4
These decisions have invariably been reached without judicial
reference to the commercial background, including the practices of the
construction industry and the expectations of the parties in terms of
the customs of the trade. Courts adhere to the view that business cus-
tom, usage, or course of dealing will not form a contract.5 Factual
inquiry is limited to determining whether the subcontractor-offeror
received the consideration contemplated by his offer. The general
contractor will claim he furnished sufficient consideration by using the
subcontract bid. Uniformly, the courts reject this argument. Yet a
1. Six construction bidding cases have been found which reached the appellato
level in the past two years, as compared to only twelve cases for the thirty years
prior to 1952. See Shultz, The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of Business Practice in
the Construction Industry, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 237, 240 n.6 (1952) [hereinafter
cited as Shultz].
2. Restatement, Contracts § 35 (1932).
3. E.g., James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
4. E.g., Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
5. Restatement, Contracts § 249, illustration 2 (1932), Robert Gorden, Inc.,
v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1941) (applied to construction
bidding).
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survey of construction-industry practice indicates that after the general
contractor informs the subcontractor that he has used his bid, both
parties consider themselves bound, although formal acceptance, which
comes only after award of the main contract, has not been made.
Courts as well as commentators have been unable to find a common
law contract theory sufficient to bind both parties.7
The nature of the law of consideration is thought to be the reason
for the courts' refusal to find a contract.8 The inflexibility of considera-
tion is expressed by the rule of construction that an offer envisages
only one mode of acceptance-either a return promise, or an act
bargained for and given in exchange for the offeror's promise. This
rule is a formulation of the common law dichotomy between unilateral
and bilateral contracts, acknowledged by the Restatement of Contracts
as inherent in the nature of contracts.10 The results of this dichotomy
are illustrated in law school classrooms by a number of ex-
amples. In a common illustration, the offeror says: Climb the flag-
pole and I will give you X dollars. The offeree begins to climb, but,
when he is halfway up, the offeror revokes his offer. Since the offer was
for a unilateral contract, no contract was formed until the act was
completed. Until that time the offeror retained his right of revocation.
Faced with the inequities of this situation, the Restatement employs an
estoppel principle to create a firm offer so that the offeror cannot re-
voke. But the firm offer binds only the offeror. The offeree, halfway up
the flagpole, is free to seek a better offer.
This problem plagues the construction industry.' If the sub-
contractor is free to revoke his offer, the general contractor is likely to
be hurt when he is, figuratively, halfway up the flagpole. Even if the
subcontractor's offer is made firm by use of an estoppel principle, the
general contractor, with his stronger bargaining power, is still free to
look for a better offer. Thus, under either theory one of the parties is
left without complete protection.
To handle the problem of the withdrawn bid, one writer has sug-
gested the revitalization of the common law seal.'- Legislative methods
6. Shultz at 261, 267. The survey was directed to general contractors and
subcontractors in Indiana. 65 of the 80 general contractors canvassed felt bound
to give the job to the subcontractor whose bid they had used. 75 of the 93 sub-
contractors canvassed felt bound to perform the contract when notified that the
bid had been used, even if there were an unexpected rise in the price of materials.
7. See, e.g., Illiams v. Favret, 161 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1947); 1 Corbin,
Contracts § 24 n.11 (rev. ed. 1963).
8. Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 414, 333 P2d 757, 760 (1958);
Ashley, Offers Calling for a Consideration Other Than a Counter Promise, 23
Harv. L. Rev. 159 (1910).
9. Restatement, Contracts § 52 (1932).
10. "(1) Consideration for a promise is (a) an act other than a promise,
or... (d) a return promise, bargained for and given in exchange for the promise."
Restatement, Contracts § 75 (1932).
11. Shultz at 239. See generally Schueller, Bid Depositories, 58 Mich. L.
Rev. 497 (1960).
12. Keyes, Consideration Reconsidered-The Problem of the Withdrawn Bid,
10 Stan. L. Rev. 441, 470 (1958).
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for making bids firm offers have been enacted.1 But either solution
has the same effect as the firm offer created by detrimental reliance on
the withdrawn bid: each would protect the general contractor's expecta-
tions, but would fail to protect those of the subcontractor. From his study
of the construction industry, Professor Shultz concluded that if both
parties are not bound, neither should be bound.14 But this suggestion,
too, is unsatisfactory. The more trouble the general contractor and
subcontractor have in binding each other, the more the awarding
authority-the third party with an interest in the bidding-may be
hurt, either by having to pay a higher price or by not getting the best
product for his money.
Thus the construction industry, whose business practices are
dependent upon the law of contracts, has been adversely affected by
the operation of contract theory. The theoretical difficulties have
created numerous practical problems. Recent events indicate that one
result of not binding both parties is that members of the construction
industry have been forced to circumvent the law and the ethical
standards of their trade associations.YG In addition, obligations created
by justifiable detrimental reliance are difficult to determine in advance
of litigation, thereby creating uncertainty which threatens the security
of bidding transactions. Contract draftsmen, intending to effect a
different result, are faced with almost insurmountable difficulties.
Finally, the construction bidding cases have affected the interests--
largely ignored by the courts---of the party inviting the general con-
tractor's bid. This Note attempts to present a basis for resolving the
problems manifested by the construction bidding cases, which is
consistent with accepted contract theory.
II
Baird AND Drennan: PEAS OF A Pon
The two leading cases involving the facts generic to construction
bidding cases are James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros.10 and Drennan v.
Star Paving Co.,' 7 the former decided by Judge Learned Hand, the
latter by Chief Justice (then Justice) Roger Traynor. The two cases
reach different results and are often viewed as thesis and antithesis.18
The impact of Baird and Drennan is such that courts rarely decide con-
struction bidding cases without considering them.
A. James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros.
Gimbel Brothers, bidding for a linoleum subcontract, had an
employee compute the amount of linoleum required for the job. The
13. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-205.
14. Shultz at 282-85.
15. Compare H.R. 7168, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(b) (1957), with Sugges-
tions on Bidding Ethics, Mechanical Contractor, Dec. 1963, p. 24.
16. 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
17. 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
18. See N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir.
1963).
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employee underestimated the total yardage by about one-half the
amount, but his mistake was not discovered until after Gimbels had
sent its bid to twenty or thirty general contractors likely to bid for the
main contract. Baird, a general contractor, received the bid on Decem-
ber twenty-eighth. On that day Gimbels discovered its mistake and
telegraphed all the general contractors that it withdrew the bid and
would substitute a new one at double the price. The withdrawal reached
Baird on the twenty-eighth, subsequent to Baird's submission of a
lump-sum bid based upon Gimbels' original offer. Baird's bid was ac-
cepted by the awarding authority on the thirtieth, one day before Baird
received confirmation of Gimbels' withdrawal. Baird formally accepted
Gimbels' offer on the second of January. Gimbels refused to perform,
and Baird brought suit for damages. Baird contended that a contract
was formed when it submitted the subcontractor's bid to the awarding
authority, since this act was done before notice of revocation. The
question thus presented was whether use of the subcontract bid prior
to revocation constituted an acceptance.
Judge Hand acknowledged it was possible for the parties to make
a contract where use of the subcontract bid would constitute an accept-
ance. "[T]he question is merely as to what was meant; that is, what is
to be imputed to the words they used."'-9 To determine this, the court
looked specifically at the language of the offer: "'If successful in being
awarded this contract, it will be absolutely guaranteed,... and... we
are offering these prices for reasonable' (sic) 'prompt acceptance after
the general contract is awarded.' 2o The offer was interpreted in two
steps. The court first considered the meaning intended by the parties,
as determined by judicial notice, and then applied the rule of construc-
tion that an offer contemplates a single mode of acceptance.21
Judge Hand said the offer contemplated communication of an
acceptance after the contract award. He found that the parties did not
bargain for the use of the bid. In fact, he asserted, use of the bid was a
matter of complete indifference to Gimbels, and to consider its use an
acceptance would distort the offer's languageY- Judge Hand's argument
was not complex. The offer made by Gimbels was a promise; a return
promise was contemplated as the consideration to form a contract. The
act of using the bid was not the envisaged mode of acceptance and
therefore did not supply the consideration to form a contract.
The Firm Offer.-The language of Gimbels' offer "guaranteed" it
19. 64 F.2d at 346.
20. Id. at 345. The grammatical error was pointed out by Judge Hand.
There would appear to be two possible ways to correct the error, either by con-
sidering "reasonable" as adverbial, or by placing a comma after reasonable so
that the offer in essence would require a "reasonable and prompt acceptance." Judge
Hand, committed to determining what was meant by the offer, only considered the
former. Considering the offer as requesting a reasonable and prompt acceptance
would result in a radically different interpretation. See text accompanying notes
62-65 infra.
21. Id. at 346.
22. Ibid.
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would be held open; but no matter how strong the language, the com-
mon law has never permitted a firm offer without consideration. It was
argued that the use of the bid by the general contractor furnished the
consideration to keep the bid open, making the offer an option contract.
But Judge Hand's finding that Gimbels did not care whether its bid was
used meant that use of the bid was not bargained-for consideration and
that therefore there was no consideration to form an option contract
either. Judge Hand could find no reason to suppose that Gimbels in-
tended to subject itself to the one-sided obligation caused by creating a
firm offer. In this respect the court appeared to be taking judicial notice
of the market situation and the bargaining power of the parties.
Reliance.-The general contractor, Baird, made a strong case for
using the reliance doctrine-Section 90 of the Restatement. But Judge
Hand's interpretation that the offer could only be accepted after the
main contract award and therefore was subject to revocation until that
time precluded use of the argument that the general contractor justifiably
relied. 28 Moreover, the reliance doctrine, codified the year before by the
Restatement, had never been applied to commercial transactions, and
Judge Hand found it applicable only in charity cases, where unbar-
gained-for consideration could be used to form a contract.
B. Drennan v. Star Paving Co.
In Drennan v. Star Paving Co.,24 the defendant subcontractor sub-
mitted his bid to the general contractor on the same day that the general
contractor's bid had to be submitted to the awarding authority. The
defendant was the lowest bidder and the general contractor used his
bid, submitting his name25 as the paving subcontractor. The bids were
opened on that day and the plaintiff's bid was the lowest.
The next morning, on his way to work, the plaintiff stopped at the
subcontractor's office formally to accept the bid. He introduced himself
and, before he could say anything more, was told that a mistake had
been made on the bid and that Star Paving could not possibly do the
work for the price it had bid. The plaintiff told Star Paving that it was
bound on the main contract and would have to do the job for that
price, but Star Paving refused to perform for the price bid. Plaintiff,
forced to contract with a higher bidding subcontractor, brought an
action against Star Paving for damages.
In Drennan, neither the negotiations of the parties nor the customs
of the trade were discussed. The court simply found no evidence either
that the general contractor's use of the bid was an acceptance of the
bid conditioned on receipt of the main contract, or that the bid was
irrevocable as given in exchange for the general contractor's use of
the figures. 26
23. Accord, 1 Corbin, Contracts § 51 (rev. ed. 1963).
24. 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
25. This was required by statute in California for public construction, Cal.
Gov't Code §§ 4106-07 (West Supp. 1964).
26. 51 Cal. 2d at 413, 333 P.2d at 759.
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C. The Similarities: Restatement Alternatives
The Drennan opinion merely acknowledged the Baird decision, 
-
but that Baird vitally influenced Drennan is a reasonable inference
from the nature of the court's conclusions-they appear to be a reitera-
tion of those reached in Baird. Judge Hand foreclosed analysis of the
bid offer by asserting that a bid is a promise and contemplates an
exchange promise. The act of submitting the bid was not the envisaged
mode of acceptance. The bargaining of the parties was thus viewed in
terms of the unilateral-bilateral dichotomy with the bidding situation
considered bilateral, contemplating the formation of a bilateral con-
tract. That the Drennan court does not challenge the Baird reasoning
is obvious from the court's analysis of the facts to determine if a con-
tract could still be formed. The bargaining of the parties was first
viewed in terms of the unilateral contract. In viewing the bid as an
offer for an act, the use of the bid being the act, the court discussed the
applicability of Section 45 of the Restatement.28 This was a trial balloon
in the attempt to find a contract. The modern view, the court indicated,
is to find an implied promise that the offeror will not revoke the offer
once the act is begun. But the court rejected the applicability of
section 45 to these facts, deciding that the offer envisaged the forma-
tion of a bilateral contract, and that section 45 is operative only
where the offer is for a unilateral contract. Rejection of section 45
was an acceptance of Judge Hand's analysis: the court was searching
for an exchange of promises; an act for a promise would not do.
Although section 90 has the same effect as section 45, the court
could use it, since, unlike section 45, it operates specifically in a bilateral
context. The court felt that "reasonable reliance resulting in a foresee-
able prejudicial change in position affords a compelling basis also for
implying a subsidiary promise not to revoke an offer for a bilateral
contract."'' 9 It found reliance, and then held that the firm offer thereby
created was seasonably accepted.
While Baird rejected the reliance doctrine in commercial trans-
actions, Drennan accepted it. The impact of these decisions on the
recent cases has emphasized this polarity. A difference in result gives
the impression that there was a difference in the premises of Baird and
Drennan. Actually, Drennan needed the Baird analysis to support its
position. One court, reviewing an appeal from summary judgment in
favor of the general contractor, said: "And, as in Baird, the mere use
of the bid was not an acceptance in law which gave rise to a con-
27. Id. at 415, 333 P.2d at 760.
28. The heading to § 45 is entitled: Revocation of Offer for Unilateral Con-
tract; Effect of Part Performance or Tender. "The main offer includes as a subsi-
diary promise, necessarily implied, that if part of the requested performance is
given, the offeror will not revoke his offer ... ." Restatement, Contracts § 45,
comment b (1932).
29. 51 Cal. 2d at 414, 333 P.2d at 759.
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tract ... ,"30 and remanded the case to determine, in terms of the
Drennan decision, whether there was substantial detriment due to
justifiable reliance. Thus, reliance does not become an operative legal
principle until it is accepted that the subcontractor's offer did not
envisage use of the bid as an acceptance.
Baird and Drennan both started, therefore, with the same premises.
Both courts worked within the unilateral-bilateral view of contract
formation. Both, as well, assumed there is a reliance doctrine operative
in the law of contracts. They disagreed only as to the doctrine's appli-
cability. Finally, both courts relied entirely upon abstract reasoning
and contractual language in reaching their decisions. Neither considered
the meaning of the negotiations of the parties in terms of trade practice,
or the expectations of the parties, or the possible effects of the alterna-
tive holdings on the construction industry.
III
INDUSTRY PRACTICE UNDER Baird AND Drennan
There are three parties to the construction contract: the awarding
authority, the general contractor, and the subcontractor. The awarding
authority initiates the competition among general contractors and
among subcontractors in an attempt to obtain, through competitive
bidding, the best product at the lowest price. The general contractors
and subcontractors commit themselves to do a satisfactory job in ex-
change for a contemplated profit. These are the desired ends of the
parties, against which the results of the theoretical approaches dis-
cussed above, should be tested.
A. Baird: No Contract
The holding in Baird leaves the general contractor free to accept
or reject and the subcontractor free to revoke even after the main con-
tract is awarded. Thus, the general contractor is free, after he has been
awarded the main contract, to attempt to reduce the subcontractor's
quoted price by shopping for lower bids.31 A reduction of five per cent
generally is easily obtained since there is a wide range in the prices
quoted for many jobs.32 While this power can be controlled by contract
draftsmanship, in his study of the industry Professor Shultz found that
only twenty of the eighty general contractors canvassed ever used bind-
30. N. Litterlo & Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 736, 739 (D.C.
Cir. 1963).
31. Bid shopping is the term applied to the general contractor's practice of
canvassing subcontractors for lower bids. Bid peddling, its counterpart, occurs when
subcontractors approach general contractors after the contract award and offer
lower bids. See Christiansen v. Mechanical Contractor's Bid Depository, 5 Trade
Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.) fI 71137 (D.C. Utah June 3, 1964).
32. Bids may vary as much as 50%. In Richards Constr. Co. v. Air Condi-
tioning Co., 318 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1963), the general contractor received one
bid for zinc sheeting for $173,395, another for $83,277, and a third for $48,733.
The architect bad estimated the work at $16,000. A subcontractor's trade associa-
tion revealed that 10% is not a high price cut. See Shultz at 269 n.95.
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ing devices.33 Of those twenty only six bound themselves contractually
to the subcontractor. This seems entirely reasonable, since it is to the
advantage of the general contractor not to be bound after the main
contract is awarded. His bargaining position has become ideal-he has
captured the market. The only commitment that the general contractor
has under Baird is to do the total job at a given price; he is encouraged
to bid shop for prices lower than those which have determined his total
contract price. Any lower prices are windfall profits. This market situa-
tion was discussed at Senate hearings concerning federal construction
bills.3 4 The subcontractors testified that before the award of the main
contract, the general contractor and the subcontractor need each other
equally; after the main contract award, the general contractor controls
the market and can dictate terms.&3 5 This information is corroborated
by the Shultz study.3
A subcontractor, even when on a substantially equal footing with a
general contractor, is aware that the general contractor, when awarded
the main contract, will be induced to try to obtain a lower price for the
subcontract job. The subcontractor will react by trying to retain part
of his bargaining power. Expecting that there will be bid shopping, he
may pad his bid to be able to make reductions in price during the
course of further negotiation.
The effect of these practices on the awarding authority can only
be adverse. The price that he must pay will have been determined by
competition among general contractors, but the total bids may have
been inflated because of padded subcontract bids. Alternatively, if the
subcontract bids are not padded and the general contractor is able to
effect a reduction in the subcontract price, the awarding authority may
feel the result in substandard work or materials37 because the sub-
contractor has skimped on materials to make a profit. The bidding
system backfires.
Subcontractors are unhappy about bid shopping and bid ped-
dling.3 s The subcontractor wants to be low bidder, but at the same
33. Shultz at 262. The devices used were contract option and bid bond. It
is perhaps noteworthy that the survey asked if they ever considered binding the
subcontractor; the results, therefore, may not accurately reflect the current general
practice in the trade.
34. Hearings on S. 1644 Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. (1955). See Schueller, supra note 11, at 500-0s,
for a discussion of many of the conclusions of the open hearings concerning federal
construction bills before Congress.
35. Hearings on S. 1644, supra note 34, at 206.
36. Shultz at 284-85.
37. See, Report of the Subcommittee on "Or Equal Clause" of The Building
Industry Practices Committee of the New York Building Congress, Inc., April 1962.
The committee indicates that use of the "or equal clause" in specifying materials
leads to bid shopping, and reputable bidders are put to unfair disadrantage by
marginal operators. The committee recommends that the contract make specific
the material to be used.
38. See Mechanical Contractor, Dec. 1963, pp. 21-33. The section on bidding
ethics begins with a fable. Bathasar wished to make a pilgrimage to Mecca.
"What would be a fair price for conveyance on such a journey?" The
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time he must keep himself from being squeezed. He will try to submit
his bid at the last possible moment before the general contractor must
submit his total bid; this is done to hedgeIagainst any last minute
pre-award shopping by the general contractor. But this practice leads to
errors in bids, as the Drennan facts indicate.
The subcontractor's post-award alternatives are limited. He can,
by draftsmanship, bind the general contractor by contract. To do this,
however, the subcontractor must have a very strong position in the
market-the general contractor must need the subcontractor more than
the subcontractor needs him. Few subcontractors have this bargaining
power. Professor Shultz asked subcontractors if they had ever con-
sidered binding the general contractor before the award, by getting him
to sign a contract conditional on receipt of the job, by putting up a bid
bond, or by some other device. Only fifteen of the ninety-two canvassed
subcontractors had ever used any of these methods.89 The subcon-
tractors, it was reported, believed they could not compel general con-
tractors to follow the rules for bidding proposed by trade associations.
They felt that even in a tight market they lacked the bargaining power
to bind the general contractor. 40
This is a different view of the construction industry from that
presented in the generic cases. In those cases, the general contractor is
the plaintiff, hurt by a subcontractor's mistake. The general contractor
appears to be the vulnerable party who needs protection. Actually,
industry practice reveals it is the general contractor who controls the
bargaining. The mistake cases are probably unrepresentative of the
problems in the field; yet, it is from these generic facts that the law has
been made for resolving the entire gamut of contractual problems aris-
ing in the construction industry.
The Dynamics of the Marketplace.-The dynamics of the market
situation is illustrated by Air Tech. Corp. v. General Elec. Co.,41 where
the subcontractor was the plaintiff. Air Technology Corporation (ATC)
submitted a proposal, expensive to develop, which included a design for
electromagnetic sensors to be used to determine the direction and yield
of nuclear detonations. This proposal was instrumental in General
Electric's (GE) obtaining the prime contract from the Air Force. 42 At
the time the proposals for the sensors were being submitted, GE needed
jackasses counseled among themselves and replied, "one bale of hay and
three bags of dates." Bathasar said, "That is a fair price. I wish to make
this journey but will not pay this price. Is there any among you who
will be willing to do it for less?" And loI four and twenty jackasses
stepped forth as one, each with a lower bid. And there followed great
commotion, each trying to bid lower than the other until the biggestjackass of them all came forth with a price of one bag of dates. Balthasar
said, "you fool, do you not know you cannot subsist let alone make a
profit?" The Jackass replied, "It is true but I wanted the order." Since
that day all jackasses have been called fools and all price cutters have
been called jackasses ....
39. Shultz at 270.
40. Ibid.
41. 199 N.E.2d 538 (Mass. 1964).
42. Id. at 543.
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ATC because the proposals were expensive and ATC had the know-how
which would probably satisfy the Air Force.43 ATC was a "member of
the team" while GE contemplated a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, but
GE was awarded the prime contract on a cost-plus-incentive-fee basis;
thus, by cutting costs, GE could gain additional profit. GE had the
prime contract, and since ATC's performance could be duplicated from
its proposal, it became more profitable for GE not to be bound. Accord-
ingly, GE informed ATC that it did not consider itself bound. This
case is not a perfect example of the normal market situation, because
GE's contract terms changed. But the contract terms had become such
that by shaving money from the "target price" GE could increase its
profit. ATC, invaluable before the award of the prime contract, lost its
bargaining power and was asked to compete with other subcontractors
-a situation identical to that created by the bid shopping which occurs
in the normal case. ATC was put to great expense to make its bid, but
traditionally the offeror takes a chance and, under the rules in Baird
and Drennan, is not offered any protection. In this case, however, the
court found that a contract had been formed, conditioned on the prime
contract's award, because GE had named ATC as a "team member."
Result: The Bid Depository.-For subcontractors to bargain
effectively within the framework of the Baird and Drennan rules some
method had to be found to bind the general contractor at an earlier
point in time. The only technique available to subcontractors was to
achieve a bargaining position strong enough to be able to withhold
quotes from general contractors who were shopping around and to dis-
courage other subcontractors from peddling bids. This required collec-
tive strength and organization; hence, the bid depository.
Basically a bid depository is a facility, usually operated by a trade
association, created to collect bids from subcontractors and make them
available to general contractors." The subcontractors use the rules of the
depository to capitalize on their combined bargaining strength. The rules
are in the form of by-laws, and attempt to prevent bid shopping and bid
peddling. Depositories set deadlines when bids must be let. They do not
give bids to general contractors who bid shop, and they impose penalties
upon noncomforming members who peddle bids. The gain in subcontrac-
tor bargaining power which depositories obtain, however, may be at the
expense of free competition. In Christiazsen v. Mechanical Contractor's
Bid Depository,45 Rule V of the Mechanical Contractor's Bid Deposi-
tory was ruled a per se violation of the Sherman Act, because of the
explicit understanding that the general contractors would use only bids
received from the depository. The depository argued that its purpose
43. In fact, one of the remedies sought by ATC was daimages for the ap-
propriation of trade secrets-the proposed designs for the sensors. The court re-
jected this contention because ATC had made the proposal available to a number
of general contractors.
44. Schueller, supra note 11, at 495.
45. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.) ff 71137, at 79491 (D.C. Utah
June 3, 1964). An appeal has been filed. Letter from attorney for appellant to
New York University Law Review, Sept. 21, 1964.
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was to prevent bid shopping and bid peddling rather than to eliminate
competition, and that it eliminated obnoxious effects upon the award-
ing authority, general contractor and subcontractor. The court answered
that while the rules of the association guaranteed the integrity of the
bidding system, the system itself was exclusionary; only general con-
tractors who dealt through the bid depository could participate.40 This
feature restrained competition.
Rule V was changed by the depository in April 1963 to permit
the letting of bids to nondepository members, but the court found that
the system continued to be exclusionary. "Indeed," the court remarked,
"continued observance of at least the spirit of rule V seems the sine qua
non of the defendant's entire method... of controlling bidding through
the depository in an endeavor to eliminate bid peddling and shopping.147
The bid depository is symptomatic of the problems in the industry.
The consequence of the Baird rule, fostering post-award competition, is
that the subcontractors vie for strong bargaining positions. The com-
petition fostered does little for the parties involved. By forcing the
subcontractor to pad his bids, post-award competition makes phony
the parties pre-award activities, and the awarding authority gains
nothing. Finally, any possibility of benefit from post-award competition
is completely outweighed by its tendency to result in excessive general
contractor power and in the subcontractor monopolies which arise in
response to this power.
B. Drennan: The Firm Offer
The Drennan holding results in an even greater aggravation of the
market situation. Normally, the general contractor holds the bargaining
power at the time he is awarded the main contract, but he still has a
contract to perform. To do this, he needs the subcontractors, so his
control over the market depends upon their availability. The market
may be a tight one in which a single subcontractor has control, or there
may be active competition for subcontractors because a number of
general contractors have undertaken similar projects. Under the Baird
holding, therefore, the general contractor, once he is awarded the main
contract, takes the market as he finds it. The Drennan holding changes
this situation completely by assuring the general contractor a firm offer
and complete control of the market, thus enabling him to negotiate from
strength. In a competitive market he can bid shop in the interim be-
tween the submission of his bid and the award of the main contract; in
a tight market, he can meet his commitments by forcing the sub-
contractor to perform. It is true that the firm offer is lost if the general
contractor begins to shop around or if he demands a lower price from
the subcontractor. But the detriment caused by thus losing the firm
46. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. at 79491.
47. Id. at 79492. One commentator indicates that no depositories are largo
enough to be effective. The General Contractor's View Point, Mechanical Con-
tractor, Dec. 1963, p. 27. If depositories were any larger, of course, they would
be even more susceptible to attack on antitrust grounds.
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offer is insubstantial. Bid shopping and bid peddling continue unabated,
as indicated by the existence of bid depositories in California,4 8 where
the Drennan rule was propounded, and despite the probable recognition
by the construction industry in states such as Utah4o that a decision
favoring the California rule is likely.50
Bid shopping indicates that the general contractor is sometimes
willing to give up the firm offer established by his reliance. In practice,
the general contractor probably knows the market situation when he
receives his first bids. Since the market will not change drastically from
day to day, the chance of improper assessment is slight. With a firm
offer, the market becomes completely stabilized for the general con-
tractor. Even the more powerful subcontractor will find it difficult to
draft around a firm offer created by detrimental reliance, because the
reliance doctrine is not part of the bargaining situation but is opera-
tive as a matter of law. Thus, the subcontractor, to maintain his bar-
gaining power, must still pad his bids so that he can lower his prices for
the benefit of the general contractor. The awarding authority is there-
fore in no better position under the Drennan rule than he is under Baird.
Negotiation Under Drennan.-The reliance doctrine has added a
measure of inflexibility to the negotiations of the general contractor and
the subcontractor. In the construction industry, the most important
contract term is the price, which is usually negotiated orally, and deter-
mines the contract. It can be fixed on the basis of job specifications
alone. But there are other terms which require further bargaining, and
which are usually settled after the main contract award.
In N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 1 where the reliance
doctrine was considered, the court explored this area of further bar-
gaining. Litterio pointed out that the reliance doctrine is operative in
the area of offer and acceptance, a rigid area in the common law. If the
acceptance differs from the offer it is deemed, under the common law, a
counter offer .0 It follows that the reliance doctrine should not be opera-
tive in such a case because if the acceptance differs there was no reliance
on the offer as made. Litterio indicated that in the construction trade
application of the reliance doctrine is justified although an acceptance
differs, so long as the terms changed were relatively insignificant.'P The
most recent case considering this problem, however, held the reliance
doctrine inapplicable. 4 As a counter offeror, the plaintiff had no right
48. See generally Schueller, supra note 11.
49. See Christiansen v. Mechanical Contractor's Bid Depository, S Trade
Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.) ff71137 (D.C. Utah June 3, 1964).
50. See Union Tank Car Co. v. Wheat Bros., 15 Utah 2d 101, 387 P.2d
1000 (1964) (dictum).
51. 319 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
52. Restatement, Contracts § 38 (1932).
53. 319 F.2d at 739 n-. The terms the general contractor requested were:
(1) sole discretion to withhold subcontractors' funds for not complying with
contract terms, (2) a liquidated damages clause, and (3) an option to make joint
progress payments to the subcontractor and his supplier.
54. Brook v. Oberlander, 199 N.E.2d 613 (I. 1964).
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to rely on the defendant's bid. This holding seems to indicate the
course the courts will take.55
The argument that the reliance doctrine creates an inflexible bar-
gaining context can be countered by Richards Constr. Co. v. Air Condi-
tioning Co.,56 where the court found that, since reliance obligations were
difficult to determine in advance of litigation, a subcontractor's for-
bearance to assert a good faith claim that there was no obligation aris-
ing from the general contractor's alleged reliance would be sufficient
consideration to make binding a contractual modification. This theory
could provide the flexibility necessary to allow the parties to bargain,
but the holding is self-limiting in that it requires special facts to make
a claim that would provide consideration for a contractual modifica-
tion. If the uncertainty of reliance obligations could provide a standard
defense, it would only do so for the subcontractor. As the offeror, how-
ever, he normally would have no use for this defense.
But the holding in Richards is disconcerting in light of the court's
assertion that the parties were "ruthless in the pursuit of profit" and
therefore not trustworthy.57 It could become a practice for subcon-
tractors to make mistakes intentionally, bidding very low in a competi-
tive market. Once the offer was accepted, the uncertainty of a reliance
obligation would provide consideration for a modification. The sub-
contractor would gain the advantage of having eliminated his competi-
tors from the field, and would be able, in effect, to bid again, with
knowledge of the other offers made. The general contractor would be
committed contractually to the low figure and any modification would
lower his profit. He would be forced to squeeze the awarding authority,
or another subcontractor, to maintain his profit. Bidding practices thus
might be corrupted by the uncertainty created by the reliance doctrine.
C. Proposed Solutions
Separate Contracts.-It has been suggested that separate contracts
between the awarding authority and subcontractors, bypassing the
general contractor, will eliminate many of the bad practices in the
industry and benefit the awarding authority. The general contractor,
however, is an important and permanent fixture in the construction
industry. The American Institute of Architects gives a number of
warnings to architects contemplating bypassing the general contractor.5 8
The architect may find that subcontractors will submit higher bids to
him than they would to a general contractor, whose skill they know will
enable them to work more efficiently and profitably. The Institute also
warned that separate contracts should only be attempted where the
architect is a capable administrator and has his office well organized. It
55. Strict construction has even been applied to purportedly liberal legislative
provisions. See, e.g., Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir.
1962).
56. 318 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1963), affirming 200 F. Supp. 167 (D. Hawaii
1961).
57. 200 F. Supp. at 170.
58. Handbook of Architectural Practice, III, p. 7.04 (1958).
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cautioned that the architect's ability to screen out poor subcontractors
is no better than his ability to screen out poor general contractors, and
there are many more subcontractors. An investigation of New York
City school buildings, constructed under separate contracts as required
by statute,5 9 resulted in recommendations that general contractors be
employed to supervise construction in order to prevent overlapping
work assignments and jurisdictional disputes.6 0
Bid Listing.-Subcontractors suggest bid listing as a means of
combatting the difficulties in the industry. This would require the gen-
eral contractor to list the names of his subcontractors with his bid. But
the utility of bid listing alone seems doubtful. Bid listing in Drcnnan
failed to prevent Star Paving from withdrawing its bid. The operation
of the reliance principle in conjunction with bid listing may, however,*
be an effective means of curbing bid shopping and bid peddling, be-
cause the general contractor will be committed as soon as the award is
made. But the difficulties created by the reliance doctrine in proof and in
uncertainty of obligation, and the fact that the general contractor is
not contractually bound by listing his subcontractors, indicates that
even this solution is inadequate.
IV
AN ALTERNATIVE: THE FULCRUM-POINT APPROACH
A. The Uniform Commercial Code
The Uniform Commercial Code is the model for the analytical
approach taken by this Note. Professor Llewellyn, the principal drafts-
man of the Code's sales provisions, was aware that if the Code ac-
cepted one line of cases in the common law, it might have to reject
another. He remarked that no one can consider the common law of
contracts as "a unit without doing violence to some cases or some of the
received categories, or both."8 ' What Professor Llewellyn considered
the best of the common law of contracts was used to frame the sections
relating to the formation of sales contracts. Thus, while the Code is a
new distillate, it rests upon the basic materials of the common law, and
it was designed to handle problems similar to those arising in Baird.
The Code rejects the unilateral-bilateral dichotomy at formation
of contracts and provides new, dearly delineated rules for construing
offers. Section 2-204, dealing with the formation of contracts generally,
allows a contract to be made in any manner sufficient to show agree-
ment, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence
of a contract. This makes explicit the practice of common law courts to
find implied-in-fact contracts. Section 2-204(2) indicates that even
though the moment of agreement is undetermined, if there is an agree-
59. N.Y. State Finance Law § 135 (McKinney Supp. 1963).
60. New York State Commission of Investigation, An Investigation of the
New York City School Construction Program 209 (1962).
61. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contracts, Offer and Acceptance (pt. I), 48
Yale LJ. 1 (1939).
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ment the parties are bound. These two provisions focus on the conduct
of the parties, allowing the court to inquire into the meaning of such
conduct.
Section 2-206(a) provides that "an offer to make a contract shall
be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium
reasonable in the circumstances." Read together with section 2-204, this
section demands that courts avoid viewing the relationship of the parties
within the narrow framework of the unilateral-bilateral dichotomy.
The Code thus rejects the theory that only a single mode of acceptance
is normally envisaged by an offer, adopting a more flexible view of
consideration. The Code would change the interpretation of the Baird
offer. The rule of construction used by the Baird court forced Judge
*Hand to interpret the offer as allowing acceptance only by communica-
tion of acceptance after the award. Any other interpretation of the
offer, Judge Hand stated, would wrench the language of the offer. But
would it? It would appear that Judge Hand's interpretation was much
too literal. Professor Llewellyn asserts that certain presumptions can
be made about offers in a bargaining situation: "[A] business offer
is made... in the hope of getting a deal closed .. and of making it
reasonably easy to close, so far as manner of acceptance goes."0 2 For
the offer to be deemed acceptable only by communication after the
award, would mean that the offeror, to his own disadvantage, would
actually be postponing the time when the offer could be accepted. To
thus extend the time to accept gives the offeree, in a competitive situa-
tion, time to shop around for a lower bid, thereby decreasing the com-
petitive status of the bid. It would appear from the Baird analysis that
this raises the question "whether a deal, a final closing, is being invited,
and even urged," and as Llewellyn suggests, the "question goes to
whether we have a definitive offer at all."03 Gimbels took the time and
expense to compute its bid. The offer was sent to twenty or thirty
general contractors to make more likely its use by the general contractor
who would win the prime contract. It would seem that this was a
definitive business offer.
Where a business offer is made, Llewellyn asserts, "horse sense
gets up an explicit rule of construction that any reasonable way of
expressing agreement will be effective, in absence of violent negation.10 4
Was the Baird offer so qualified by the request for a. communication of
an acceptance that it negated the use of the bid as an acceptance?
Judge Hand acknowledged that "it may indeed be argued that this...
language contemplated no more than early notice that the offer had
been accepted, the actual acceptance being the bid .... ," It may be
that the qualification that the acceptance be communicated reasonably
promptly after the award was designed to prevent bid shopping.
62. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance (pt. 2), 48
Yale L.J. 779, 788 (1939).
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. 64 F.2d at 346.
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Gimbels is a subcontractor and knows the practices in the trade. Rather
than postponing the time for acceptance, it may have been merely
establishing a deadline for communication of the acceptance. This is a
significant distinction which reflects business understanding. It would
make the word "guaranteed" in the offer meaningful. Under the Code,
then, use of the subcontract bid by the general contractor could be a
reasonable acceptance, forming a contract conditional on receipt of the
main contract by the general contractor.
The Code modifies the common law by allowing the offeror to
make a firm offer without consideration. 0 Professor Shultz seems to
assume that this firm-offer provision is the only provision of the Code
operative when an offer is "guaranteed," as in Baird, and he therefore
rejects the Code as a possible solution.0 7 The evidence he gathered
indicates that the subcontractor is the weaker of the two bargaining
parties, and he concludes that the firm-offer provision would only add
to this imbalance. He comments that while the firm offer may be appli-
cable to other market areas, it hinders the bargaining of the parties in
the construction industry. His estimation of what the firm offer will do
to the negotiations of the parties is correct; it would create an im-
balance similar to that caused by the firm offer created by the reliance
doctrine: the general contractor-the party with the bargaining power-
would gain absolute control of the market.
Professor Shultz is incorrect, however, in his belief that the firm-
offer provision must operate alone. It is true that a comment to section
2-205 fits the Baird offer in so far as that offer was "guaranteed." But
to use one comment as the sole criterion for interpretation is to ignore
the Code's stated, primary purpose: to give effect to the deliberatc in-
tention of a merchant to make a firm offer binding6 8 The facts sur-
rounding the formation of contracts in the construction industry indi-
cate that no subcontractor would deliberately weaken his bargaining
position by creating a firm offer. As Judge Hand said (and Professor
Shultz agreed), "there is not the least reason to suppose that the
defendant meant to subject itself to such a one-sided obligaton 2 co In
the face of this bargaining context, Professor Shultz apparently must
assume that the Code would give more weight to form than to sub-
stance, that the offer on its face would be more important than the
parties' intentions based on commercial dealing. This seems incorrect.
A court applying the Code to a Baird offer would have to inquire
whether it was the deliberate intention of the merchant to make a firm
offer, and this inquiry normally would result in rejection of the firm
offer.
More fundamentally, however, the underlying premise that the
operation of the firm-offer section prevents the operation of the section
allowing an offer to be accepted in any reasonable manner seems invalid.
66. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-205.
67. Schultz at 285.
68. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-205, comment 2. (Emphasis added.)
69. 64 F.2d at 346.
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There is, in fact, no logical barrier to the proposition that a prompt
acceptance may follow a firm offer-that both sections may operate
concurrently. Under this reading of the Code, when use of the bid
constitutes an acceptance of the bid, both parties are bound and the
question whether the offer was firm becomes moot.
The Code has no section equivalent to Section 90 of the Restate-
ment, and needs none. If the act of the offeree in starting up the flag
pole is a reasonable acceptance then both parties are bound. This is a
different view of the law of consideration than that taken by the
Restatement. It is submitted, however, that the Code merely codifies
the common law, and therefore, that the rules of construction offered by
the Code can be used in solving the common law contract problems
presented by these bidding cases. Adams v. Lindsell,70 a well-known
common law case, presents a basis for the Code's rule.
B. The Common Law Roots: Consideration
A Seminal Case.-Adams v. Lindsell was an action for damages
for the nondelivery of wool according to agreemefit. The defendants,
dealers in wool, wrote the plaintiffs on September 2, offering "eight
hundred tods of wether fleeces .. receiving your answer in course of
post." The letter was misdirected and not received by the plaintiffs
until 7:00 p.m., September 5. On that evening plaintiff wrote an
answer agreeing to accept the wool on the terms proposed. The answer,
by course of post, was not received by the defendants until September 9.
On September 8, however, not having received the expected answer,
the defendant sold the wool to another. The offeror cited the case of
Cooke v. Oxley71 to show that it was possible to revoke his offer merely
by changing his mind. The court rejected this argument, holding that a
contract was formed when the offeree mailed the letter of acceptance.
Adams is especially relevant in that its facts are not unlike those of
Baird and Drennan. All involved negotiations to form a contract to be
performed in the future; and the most important question before each
court was the time the offeree was to be bound. In Adams, however,
the court formulated a mode of acceptance which was adequate al-
though it varied from the offer's terms. The court never inquired into
the consideration contemplated by the offer, as the Baird court clearly
did, and, of course, it could not have relied upon promissory estoppel,
the basis of Drennan, since it was not at that time an available contract
theory. Although Adams is generally accepted, 2 it apparently has not
been cited or considered by any court deciding a case involving con-
struction bidding.73
What were the operative legal principles before the Adams court
70. 1 Barn. & Aid. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818).
71. 3 T.R. 653, 100 Eng. Rep. 785 (K.B. 1790).
72. Contra, Rhode Island Tool Co. v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 417 (Ct.
CI. 1955).
73. At least one writer has recognized the similarity. Sharp, Promises, Mistake,
and Reciprocity, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 286, 288 (1952).
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and how were they weighed? In Adams the court had to balance the
rule that "a man is the master of his offer" with the principle, con-
currently operative at contract formation, that there must be mutuality
of exchange in a bargain.74 The resolution in Adams rests upon two
historic decisions rendered by Lord Mansfield, Kingston v. Preston~
and Boone v. Eyre,76 cases involving constructive conditions that be-
came operative at the time of performance. The problem in Adams was
contract formation, a time at which constructive conditions are not
considered operative.
In Boone, the court held that substantial performance was sufficient
consideration to bind the parties, and thus to preserve the mutuality of
exchange. In Kingston, there had been a nominal exchange of promises,
which was considered sufficient consideration to form a contract. One
promise had been independent, the other dependent. By holding the
order of performance to be concurrent, contrary to the promises ex-
changed, the court indicated that the exchange of performances was the
real consideration in the bargain. This view of consideration emphasizes
mutuality of exchange and the power of courts to restructure bargains.
Adams was decided in accordance with Lord Mansfield's holdings.
The Adams court did not vitiate the concept of mutuality of exchange
at contract formation; rather it held that the offeror was bound by the
letter when it was dispatched. The court apparently weighted the
mutuality principle, binding both parties, more heavily than the
principle of exact consideration. If the latter had been considered more
important, the agreement would not have been effective until the letter
was received by the offeror. The effect of the court's holding was to
shorten the period in which the offeror could revoke.77 This protected
the exchange contemplated by the offeror by preventing the offeree
from speculating on the market during the time lag; it in turn enabled
the offeree to rely upon the contract from the moment he mailed the
letter. The letter might be said to have implied the exchange promise,
but the important thing is what the court did, not the fiction used to
explain its holding.
Adams and Drenman Compared.-In Drennan, the court was also
dealing with the time factor. One of the Drennan court's alternatives
was, of course, to bind the parties when the general contractor sub-
mitted the subcontract bid to the awarding authority. This would have
been equivalent to binding the parties at the time of dispatch under
Adams-both are unequivocal acts, signaling the offeree's reliance. The
second alternative was to bind the parties when an acceptance was
communicated to the offeror, equivalent to the rule that acceptance is
74. See Oliphant, Mutuality of Obligation in Bilateral Contracts at Law, 25
Colum. L. Rev. 705 (1925). Compare Corbin, Non-Binding Promises as Considera-
tion, 26 Colum. L. Rev. 550, 557 n.18 (1926); Llewielyn, supra note 61, at 795
n.23.
75. 2 Douglas 689, 99 Eng. Rep. 437 (K.B. 1773).
76. 1 HE. BI. 273, 126 Eng. Rep. 160 n.(a) (K.B. 1777).
77. MacNeil, Time of Acceptance: Too Many Problems for a Single Rule,
112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 947, 953 (1964).
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not effective until receipt. California generally follows the dispatch
rule, but in this case chose the time of receipt.
Perhaps the answer for Drennan's failure to refer to Adams is that
such a reference was unnecessary to resolve equitably the facts of that
case. The court saved the general contractor from a difficult situation by
making the offer firm at the point of reliance. That promissory estoppel
binds only the offeror, thereby vitiating the doctrine of mutuality of
exchange, may have seemed insignificant, since only the offeror had to
be bound. But the realities of the relative bargaining positions of the
parties in the industry reveal the need to bind the offeree as well. The
Adams approach is significant in that it achieves this end while promis-
sory estoppel does not.
Adams has proved to be a viable case. While the appropriateness of
the dispatch rule for certain situations has been questioned, the under-
lying principle of mutuality of exchange has not. The facts of the
construction bidding cases fit neatly into the Adams formula, and the
rule which results creates certainty for the parties and benefits the
industry. The case seems ample common law precedent for the Code's
rule that an offer can be accepted in any reasonable manner78
C. The Fulcrum Point In Negotiations: Agreement
Once agreement is reached, the rule is pacta sunt servanda, the
contract must be performed. The parties, therefore, are not to be
hastily burdened with the legal consequences. To insure this, the law
demands, in many instances, a certain degree of formality. Professor
Fuller has an excellent formula: "The need for investing a particular
transaction with some legal formality will depend upon the extent to
which the guaranties that the formality would afford are rendered super-
fluous by forces native to the situation out of which the transaction
78. See Restatement (Second), Contracts § 31 (Tent. Draft No, 1, 1964),
which proposes a significant change from the present Restatement in the interpreta-
tion of an offer. "In case of doubt an offer is interpreted as inviting the offeree
to accept either by promising to perform what the offer requests or by rendering
the performance, as the offeree chooses." This is stronger than the present § 31
which merely raises the presumption that an offer invites a bilateral contract.
Significantly, comment c to § 31 refers to the Uniform Commercial Code, Section
2-206(1) (b), where "an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current
shipment normally invites acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or by
current shipment." This would indicate that the new draft of the Restatement
considers an offer as inviting a reasonable acceptance.
The unilateral-bilateral dichotomy, however, has not altogether disappeared,
The tentative draft recognizes the unilateral-contract offer as indicated by § 45(1):
"Where an offer invites an offeree to accept by rendering performance and does
not invite a promissory acceptance, an option contract is created when the offereo
begins the invited performance or tenders part of it."
In creating a presumption of a reasonable mode of acceptance it would appear
that even when the offer specifically requests performance, both parties should be
bound. The tentative draft, however, appears to support the position taken by this
Note concerning the common law rule of construction of offers as inviting rea-
sonable acceptance. The proposed draft has been completed only up to § 74,
and therefore a definition of consideration has not yet been proposed. It appears,
however, that a more flexible position will be taken in keeping with the references
to the Code.
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arises."7 A commercial situation has its own style, its own formality,
which courts must discover properly to ascertain the need, in a given
situation, for legal formality.
The underlying issue in the construction bidding cases is not
whether exact consideration is present, but at which point in time legal
consequences should be attached to the negotiations of the parties:
When has a reasonable acceptance been made? This is the fulcrum
point in the bargain. It cannot be ascertained merely by testing for the
presence of certain legal formalities. To determine the fulcrum point
courts must obtain sufficient information about the bargaining rela-
tionship of the parties, for only in this way can they judge the extent
to which formality is superfluous.
Adams in overruling Cooke, held it is the court which selects the
fulcrum point of agreement. This rule seems to have been arrived at
with full awareness of the market's realities. Fixing agreement at a
point earlier than the time of receipt of acceptance prevented the
offeree from taking unfair advantage of changes in the market. At the
same time, he was protected from the moment the acceptance was
posted and could rely upon the deal.
The Adams view supports Professor Corbin's analysis of the offer
"to convey my land to you in return for your moving to Maine," and
his conclusion that if the offeror tried to revoke, the court would estab-
lish the point of acceptance prior to the time of attempted revocation. 0
He quotes Justice Holmes' argument that "if necessary, we should
assume that the first substantial act done by the committee was all that
was required in the way of acts to found the defendants' obligation."8 1
Here, again, the court determines the fulcrum point of agreement.
The courts are not without guidance in facing this question. They
have had extensive experience with contracts implied-in-fact and con-
structive contracts. They know that the context of negotiations may be
accorded greater weight than the alleged subjective intent of the
parties. Given the proper bargaining relationship, courts will make con-
tracts. Choosing the fulcrum point is analogous to making a construc-
tive contract, and is certainly no more difficult. Still, a factual inquiry
to determine an industry rule poses serious problems. Such an inquiry
is more difficult than the application of rules of law. But if an inquiry
is attempted, care and intelligence may lead a court to adopt the com-
mercially correct position; without asking the necessary questions
proper resolutions will be reached purely by chance.
D. The Fulcrum Point in the Construction Industry:
Use of the Subcontractor's Bid
The point at which a reasonable acceptance is made-the fulcrum
point-seems, in the construction industry, to be the time the general
contractor submits his bid. The fulcrum point must always be indige-
79. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 798, EoS (1941).
80. Corbin, The Formation of a Unilateral Contract, 27 Yale L.J. 382, 384
n.7 (1918).
81. Martin v. Mfeles, 179 Mass. 114, 118, 60 N.E. 397, 399 (1901).
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nous to the bargaining relationship of the parties. Thus, it should be
arrived at after an examination of the factual context, and should be
tailored to accomodate that factual context. One manner of determining
when the parties should be bound, is to discover when the parties
consider themselves bound. In construction bidding, the parties consider
themselves bound when the general contractor uses the subcontractor's
bid.82
An analysis of the effects which this proposed fulcrum point would
have upon bargaining in the construction industry reveals its commer-
cial aptness. The rule would restrict bargaining to the pre-award stage,
where the parties have essentially equal bargaining power. Both parties
are, of course, free to draft a different contract, binding themselves at a
later point, but such a change would normally be the product of bar-
gaining between equally powerful parties. Further, the rule would create
certainty in the industry concerning the point of contract formation:
the parties will know what to expect and know the price they will
have to pay to draft a different rule.
Of course, binding the parties when the general contractor uses the
subcontract bid greatly benefits the subcontractor since his expectations
are protected and the general contractor loses the monopoly he had in
the market. But that the proposed rule would also greatly benefit the
general contractor is easily proved. Most reported construction bidding
cases involve a general contractor arguing that the rule in the industry
should be that both parties are bound before the award of the main
contract. This argument was made in both the Baird and Drennan
cases. The reason the general contractors argue for this rule is to
prevent unscrupulous general contractors from underbidding, hoping to
make a profit from the subcontractors and their suppliers.8,3 A
reputable general contractor cannot compete in such a market, and if
he tries to compete, there is the danger that cut-throat competition will
substantially affect the quality of the ultimate product.
Binding the parties before the prime contract award determines
the price term before the award. This benefits the awarding authority,
and was considered a desirable enough result to be proposed in the pre-
amble to the proposed Federal Construction Procedures Act.84 Fixing
the price terms before the prime award removes the need for bid
shopping and bid peddling. As a result, attempts to increase profits by
lowering the quality of the materials used for the job will not be
induced, since the parties will be able to predetermine a margin of
profit. The awarding authority, thus, is more likely to get what he pur-
chases. Elimination of destructive post-award competition by binding
the parties at the time the bid is used will eliminate one of the major
reasons for bid depositories and the evils attendant to organized power.
Competition-bid shopping and bid peddling-will still occur during
the pre-award period, enabling the general contractor to obtain and
submit the lowest possible bid.
82. Supra note 6.
83. See Note, 42 I1. L. Rev. 259 (1947).
84. H.R. 7168, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
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A contract formed at the proposed fulcrum point would not limit
the flexibility of bargaining negotiations. The common law allows a
contract to be formed with open terms. If it is industry practice to
negotiate after the price term is determined and the contract awarded,
the parties will be able to do so, limited only by a good-faith obligation
to negotiate reasonable terms for the open provisions.83 The Code has
taken a similar position; its rules of construction allow for a fulcrum-
point approach to contract formationsO
It has been argued that where the awarding authority requests
alternative bids for different types of materials or different types of
construction, the general contractor must submit numerous bids to the
awarding authority and thus cannot commit himself to one subcon-
tractor. The awarding authority may want alternative bids for a
shingle roof, or a tile roof, or a tar roof, and this may require the
general contractor to submit the bids of a number of different sub-
contractors. Alternative bidding, however, has come to be discouraged
because it is too expensiveS 7 which can be seen from the number of
different estimates which may be required. Further, there is no sub-
stantive reason for distinguishing the alternative-bidding case from the
normal case. In both, the parties agree to be bound at the time the
general contractor uses the subcontractor's bid, conditional upon the
general contractor being awarded the main contract. The number of
subcontract alternatives should not matter. The general contractor is
bound to the subcontractor whose bid was material in obtaining the
award.
Despite its commercial usefulness, the proposed rule must be
judicially workable, and to be workable it must have sufficient for-
mality. The commercial context provides some of the needed formality,
but it may be objected that establishing the fulcrum point at the time
suggested is unworkable because it will be difficult to prove which bid
the general contractor used, and hence to prove that the parties were
bound. This is simply not true on public works projects in a number of
states where the general contractor must list the names of subcontractors
whose bids were used.88 Furthermore the problem is not that extensive
in the industry generally. Over half the general contractors canvassed
by Professor Shultz said they notified the subcontractor before the
award that his figure had been used, 9 indicating that the general con-
tractor wants to gain the subcontractor's commitment. It is only in the
remaining cases that a problem of proof exists.
If all general contractors were required to list the names of the
subcontractors whose bids they used, the problem would be solved. The
decision to bind the parties at the time the bid is used will itself create
85. Air Tech. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 199 N.E.2d 538, 548 (MBA.
1964).
86. Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2-305(1), 2-311(1).
87. Report of the Subcommittee on Alternative Estimates of the Building
Industry Practices Committee of the New York Building Cong., Inc. (1957).
88. See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code §§ 410-07 (West Supp. 1964); Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 149, § 44(f) (Supp. 1964).
89. Schultz at 259.
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the impetus for even more widespread adoption of bid-listing practices.
Further, it is to the benefit of the awarding authority to have prices
between general contractor and subcontractor finalized before the main
contract award. The Handbook of the American Institute of Archi-
tects"0 warns architects to exercise care in selecting a general contractor;
irresponsible general contractors discount the subcontractors' bids in
the hope that by bid shopping they will obtain lower prices. "Such
contractors have little interest in the work and their selection increases
the burden of the architect by drawing him into difficulties with incom-
petent subcontractors who are operating at a loss."' By the architect
requiring the general contractor to list his subcontractors, the under-
lying contract between general contractor and subcontractor will make
the general contractor responsible. It is to be expected that a practice
that eases the architect's burden, and is simple to implement, will
readily be adopted when mere listing provides proof of the underlying
contract. Thus, the American Institute of Architects might incorporate
bid listing into their Handbook as required practice if courts evidence
a willingness to bind the parties at the time the bid is used.
This desirable result could effectively be accomplished for govern-
ment construction contracts by legislation; but legislation is not the
only alternative. A government agency on its own initiative has re-
quired bid listing.92 The government also is interested in getting the
best product for the money paid, and here too, binding the parties when




The alternatives before a common law court deciding a case in-
volving construction bidding are not simply acceptance or rejection of
the reliance principle. The reliance principle merely serves to fill the
gap left by the unilateral-bilateral dichotomy analysis of contract for-
mation. Another alternative exists: the fulcrum-point approach. The
explicit rule of construction derived from common law precedent
should be that any reasonable manner of acceptance will bind both
parties.
In the construction bidding cases, the fulcrum point is when the
general contractor uses the subcontract bid as part of his total bid.
Binding both parties at this point would protect the reliance each
places in the other, would eliminate destructive, unethical, and mono-
polistic practices, and would tend to assure the awarding authority the
product he contemplated.
LAwRENCE LEDERMAN
90. American Institute of Architects, Handbook of Architectural Practice, III,
p. 7.02 (1958).
91. Id. at III, p. 7.04.
92. 39 Dec. of Comptroller Gen. 247, 249 (1959).
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